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African Fisheries Social Science Research Network: A Proposed Activity 
Several recent reports have emphasized the need to enhance na- 'gion to pull together economists and other social scientists for the pur- 
l tional research capacities in fisheries and aquaculture research in Af- pose of promoting research and training in the social science aspects 
rica (Fisheries and Aquaculture Research Capabilities and Needs in of fisheries. There are hundreds of mechanisms and structures which 
Africa, World Bank Technical Paper No. 149, 1991 ; Fisheries Socio- can be used to enhance social science research capabilities. A network 
economics in the Developing World. IDRC, 1993; FA0 Expert Con- approach was chosen for use in Southeast Asia to meet these needs. In 
sultation on Fisheries Research, FAO, 1994). This is especially true for 1983 the Asian Fisheries Social Science Research Network (AFSSRN) 
fisheries social science research nhich is weak in Africa, relative to was established with member researchers and institutions in Indone- 
other regions of the world. The emphasis of fisheries research institu- sia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The AFSSRN 
tions in the past has been placed on biological, rather than socioeco- has played a significant role in improving the research skills, support- 
nomic research. While the relatively great demand for biological in- ing research endeavors, providing opportunities to interact with and 
formation derives in part from the need for measuring an unseen re- learn from other fishery social science researchers in the region, and 
source in  order to manage it, this has tended to lead to a serious short- expanding the professional pool of adequately trained researchers in 
age of socioeconomic analysis. There is a priority need in Africa for fishery, aquaculture and coastal resource social science. 
socioeconomic information and for both individual and institutional ca- A similar approach is recommended for Africa. The scope and 
pacity building throughout the region. Fisheries, not being particularly methods of activities could include networking, education and training, 
important to many of the countries \\ hich can invest in research, have research support and information dissemination. It could concentrate on 
attracted relatively little attention from academic economists and soci- the economics, sociology and anthropology disciplines. The focus 
ologists. Non-academic economists, \\bile producing some relevant re- would be on developing institutional capacity by developing a core 
search, have tended to focus on development issues such as investment group of individual researchers at a particular academic institution, re- 
and marketing. search institution and government fishery agency. The geographic cov- 
A similar problem to that described above for Africa existed in erage of such a network would need to be determined. It is recom- 
Southeast Asia until the early 1980s. There was weak capacity in fish- mended to start with a small number of institutions and add more over 
eries social science research and there was no mechanism in the re- time. R.S. Pomeroy 
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Introduction 
The administration of the irrigation s! stem in 
the Pak Phanang River Basin (PPRB) is under 
the responsibility of the Regional lrrigation Of- 
fice XI (RIO XI) of the Thai Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID). The special project. namely 
the Pak Phanang Operation and Maintenance Ir- 
rigation Project (PPRB). under the RIO XI is di- 
rectly responsible for water resource manage- 
ment in the PPRB. The overall objective ofthe 
PPRB project is to provide enough fresh water 
for agriculture and domestic use to inlprove the 
welfare of the local people. The major task of 
the project includes the: draining of escess wa- 
ter during the the wet season; occasional dredg- 
ing of irrigation canals: and the prevention of 
salt water from entering the agricultural produc- 
tion area in the dry season, thus creating a stor- 
age basin within the canal system. The total 
proiect area is 2 12,136 ha, including four dis- 
tricts: Pak Phanang. Chian Yai, Hua Sai, and 
Cha Uad. Of the total project area, 73% is con- 
sidered to be in the beneficial area receiving 
benefits fronl storage, drainage, flood protection. 
and irrigation. 
In the PPRB, water is held back after the wet 
season by the head regulators, usualiy at the be- 
ginning of January and providing fresh water re- 
source to the irrigated area from April to Au- 
gust. Competition for fresh water always occur 
when the resource is limited during the dry sea- 
son. In the Pak Phanang area, surface water is 
allocated among farmers through a govemment- 
owned pump program for off-season rice pro- 
duction. The primary goal of that program is to 
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full! support farmers who have sustained crop 
' jamage\ o f  at least half o f  their expected pro- 
duct1011 in the most recent season. For those 
\ \ \ lo sustain crop damage less than the standard 
rule. the fuel costs must be paid for by those 
\\ho benefit from the use o f  the pumps. 
The stud) e\amines the ekisting water allo- 
cation methods and other policies that provide 
constraints or incentives for the most efficient 
use o f  \later resources. Given the production 
, sond~t~ons ofthe local people. and the technical 
and physical attributes o f  \later resources, the 
pr~ncipal hqpothesis ofthis stud) is that the ben- 
d efits obtained from fresh \\ater resources in the 
stud! area can be irnproled through better re- 
source management 
A surve! o f  107 rice farmers \vho utilize 
fresh water resources for off-season rice produc- 
tion \\as undertaken in the Chian Yai district o f  
the PPRB. The sur\ek data are used to estimate 
crop production functrons and to construct farm- 
le\el and communih-level optimization models. 
'The components of an empirical model include 
production function analysis, estimation o f  wa- 
ter supply in the study area. socioeconomic de- 
scription o f  the stud! area. and the construction 
o f  objective functions and constraints that de- 
scribe crop production and irrigation opportuni- 
ties at the farm level and the cornmunit) level 
(Tahle I) .  
I n  summary. the farm-level optimization 
model depicts an individual farmer's production 
decision which maximizes annual net returns to 
water. management. and fised assets, subject to 
production costs, ph!sical production functions. 
minimum production requirement for home con- 
sumption. crop acreage constraint. and water 
supply constraint, In  the community-level 
model, the objective is to maximize the sum of 
nel returns to water, management. and fixed as- 
sets that accrue to farmers in  the community, 
subject to the above constraints, at the comrnu- 
nit! level. The production functions are esti- 
mated using SAS (Statistical Analysis System). 
The optimization problems are solved using 
GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System). 
Results 
main season production. If 
the rules for using the gov- 
ernment-owntd pumps at no 
charge are strictly imple- 
mented, no farmer would ac- 
tually qualify for damage 
compensation, which allo\v 
farmers to use the pumps at 
no charge. 
Farmers who want to in- 
crease their income from off- 
season rice production. but 
cannot participate in the gov- 
ernment-owned pump pro- 
gram, use their own personal 
pumps for off-season rice 
production. The individual 
pump use is. in  fact. not 
taken into account by the ir-  
rigation officials. Ho\vever, 
this group o f  farmers obtains 
lower net revenues. wi th  
higher production costs than 
those who use the govern- 
ment-owned pumps (34 bahti 
rai compared with 248 baht! 
rai). The difference in the 
cost o f  using irrigation water 
is most apparent between 
these two groups. Farmers 
who use the government- 
owned pumps pa!. much less 
to use irrigation water than 
the farmers who cannot par- 
ticipate in the government- 
owned pump program: 
0.001 8 baht/ m' or 4 bahtirai 
compared with 0.0765 baht! 
m' or 102 bahtirai on the av- 
erage. However, the overall 
operating cost pertaining to 
the use o f  the government- 
owned pumps. if paid by the 
user, is  0.0875 bahtlm'.  
Table I Summary o f  the model 
Communily level: hlaxrmr:e Z;T(nY -A," - nr,; .A?. 
Farm level: Maximrze ( n r , " . ~ , ~  + nrj.a/), 
nrZm = p;y; - cost,", 
nr;' . = p$! - cosli, 
subject to 
1.  production functions: 
marn season: y" = yCm(v;), 
off-season: y,! = y!Lr,', w g ,  
2. cost functions: 
main season: cost," = p,,*x," - cam, 
off-season: cosr; = pJx(' - c.!H.! - cO: 
3,  area constraints: 
marn season: Z;a," 5 A,". 
off-season: ;a,! 5 A:. 
a /  5 a", 
4. s ~ c i ~ e c ~ n ~ m i c  constraint‘ 
household cons~rmp~ron: x" - y/ 2 y?. , 
5, water resource constraints. 
S = p FLOU"' - RAlf l '  - VOLrr ' 
M/,v ; L RF'J.,,l; 
I 1  = S - Wvtrtr 
<<,I. '..4/ 5 a. 
Description of rhr var~ables: 
I = ~nd~v~dua l  farmer. i=I. ,n 
J = location, j = l  .... k 
m = nlaln season product~on period 
f = OR-ssason product~on period 
Y = total production of  rice crops (kgirai) 
x = vector of variable inpurs per unit area including fertilizer ( 
seeds (kg), and family labor (hour) 
vc = total operating costs oi production that include fertilizer, 
hired labor. fuel cost. and pesticides (bahtirai) 
P = price of  rice crop (bahr kg) 
c* = the private cost of us~ng irrigation water (bahti'm3) 
w = the alnount o f  irrigation water use (m'irai) 
ca = the cost o f  using area (bahti'rai) 
a = the acreage planted (rai) 
S = total water supply in ihc study area (m?/season) 
Wmin = minimum water requirement for non-agricultural p 
season) 
P = the proportion of  the flow from the Saothong Weir 
area which is assumed fixed at 22% 
FLOWs1 = the flow volume from the Saothong Weir whic 
from the daily discharge rating curve of  the Weir 
RFC" = the rainfall depth during the imgation season (m) 
RAINCy = the rainfall volume in the study area during the i 
(m') 
VOLCy = the storage volume in the canals at the beginning o 
season in the study area 
W = net water supply available for agriculture (ml/season) 
Thus, this program, which 
initially aims to promote farmer income distribu- 
tion. can induce an unintended income discrep- 
ancy among farmers. 
The marginal social valite qf waler r r -  
sources: The marginal social value o f  water at 
the farm level becomes positive when the 
amount o f  water available to farmers is equal to 
erage. At  this current cost o f  water, the optimal 
waler use rate predicted by the model is 1,598 
mlirai. The model also predicts that a farmer 
can reduce water applications b) about 30% 
from the mean level to obtain about the same 
amount oinet revenue and yield per rai that is 
reported in the survey. 
~h~ currenl warer allocalion mechanism: 26,451 m' or 3,405 ml/rai on average. The Discussion 
Sur~e) results shon that, on the average, farm- mean level of \later\ use per 16.462 
ers produce about 8 j %  ofwhat expect from yields the marginal social value of 0 0475 baht1 
rnl, which is greater than the aLerage cost p a ~ d  For funher Improl ement o f  hater resource 
by an individual farmer, 0.0422 bahtlml. on a\ - management in the PPRB, die following alterna- 6 25 ral = I ha and USSl = Baht 25 4 (1992) tives are proposed. 
OCTO~ER 1995 5 1 
' 
1tp?ovement of water storage facilities a1 
the local level. The problem of water shortage 
during the dry season can be alleviated if addi- 
tional volume of water could be stored during 
the wet season for agricultural and 
nonagricultural uses during the dry season. The 
negative relationship between crop productivity 
and the distance from a water source to indi- 
vidual farm fields suggests that the ivater distri- 
bution system, coupled with the management 
level, should be improved so that water can be 
distributed more equitably among farmers. As 
observed, the maintenance efforts for community 
ditches vary among villages, depending on the 
effectiveness of the village committee and the 
degree of cooperation among farmers. The high 
cost of new investments to increase water sup- 
ply may not be worthwhile to local people if the 
storage facilities and the water distribution sys- 
tem essential for local use of water are not im- 
proved. 
Creating economic incentives for water us- 
ers. The effective use of water charges as a 
means to improve water management depends on 
many considerations. Volumetric pricing is an 
ideal approach to pricing irrigation water when 
the amount paid for water affects decisions re- 
garding water use. If farmers have no control 
over the volume or timing of water received, 
charging for water volumetrically would have no 
influence on their water use decisions. Imple- 
mentation cost is another concern for using volu- 
metric pricing. In the study area, the amount of 
water can be measured by the length of time that 
the water i: received. However. when a large 
number of f ~ m e r s  are involved. it is difficult to 
deliver water 'a~cordin~ to an individual farm- 
er's demand. A share of the flow or quota can 
be another alternative for volume. Charges can 
be implemented at the tertiarj unit where the 
amount of water can be approaimated and a 
small group of farmers share the water cost at 
each unit. 
The marginal value of water IS time and lo- 
cation specific, and it depends on the amount of 
water available and the marginal productivity of 
water to the communitj. Although the marginal 
social value of water is considered as the true 
price of water, irrigation fees at this price may 
be too high and farmers may be left with less in- 
come than they would have had in the absence 
of irrigation water. In setting irrigation charges, 
it may be more practical in the study area if fees 
are set to recover the marginal cost of irrigation 
services rather than the true marginal value of 
water. 
Enhancing the role of water organizations 
and institutions. The establishment of a water 
user organization is strongly encouraged and 
participation in the organization should be pro- 
moted. Farmers have detailed knowledge of lo- 
cal streamflow, soil conditions. and property 
rights, and this knowledge is essential in plan- 
ning the water allocation scheme. While imple- 
menting water prices through-the market skstem 
or through a government agencj may not be fea- 
sible politically or institutionally, the system can 
be implemented by water user organizations. 
Farm-level participation in the organizations 
could include farmers' input in selecting the 
methods of water pricing and cost recoveb. 
Alterrlative water allocation mechanism. 
The above approaches can be combined and ap- 
plied as an alternative approach to water man- 
agement in the PPRB. The analysis sho\\.s that 
farmers \vho use a government-owned pump can 
pay for the overall operating cost, even if i t  will 
reduce their net revenues. Payment for the use 
of the government-owned pump can be consid- 
ered as the cost of lease. This payment can be 
set to recover the operating cost of using the 
pump. Farmers who are willing to use the gov- 
ernment-owned pump should form the group. 
Flexibility of money collection and responsibil- 
ity for the agreement to share the cost and the 
use of water should be given to the user group. 
It is suggested that a water charge is preferable 
to other types of fees which can be paid in cash 
or in kind. When a charge is paid in kind, the 
payment system can be combined with the Rice 
Grain Banking Project implemented in the area 
by the irrigation extension officials. Hence, the 
local group-based management of irrigation wa- 
ter can be established. 
P. JANEKARNKIJ is a faculty member from the 
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Team Leaders' Meeting in Beijing 
The AFSSRN held a team leaders' meeting 
in Beijing; China on 18 October in conjunction 
1 with the Asian Fisheries Forum. Among the 
items taken up were: the future of the Network, 
publication of upcoming report series. regional 
and national \vorkshops, and various research 
grants. The discussion mainly focused on the of- 
ficial ending of IDRC support to the Network on 
3 1 March 1996 after 13 years of assistance. Fu- 
ture prospects and possible funding b! other do- 
nors were also discussed. 
Special session at AFF 
A special AFFSRN session \\.as held during 
the Asian Fisheries Forum in Beijing, China on 
16-20 October. Eleven network-members from 
various academic and research institutions from 
Thailand. h~lalaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and 
Vietnam participated in this activity. A total of 
twelve research papers \\ere presented in the 
session. 
.Vetwork men~bers puse with Dr. Robert Pomeroj: 
.A FSSR.V Coordinator, during t11e Teanr Lenders' hfeetit~g 
in Beiiilra. 
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